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ABSTRACT
This article presents a summary of findings from a five-year longitudinal study of a
cohort of full-time students from low-income backgrounds holding the national
Excellence Challenge Opportunity Bursaries and similar institutional bursaries at a
post-1992 university. This group was found to have higher levels of retention and
success, exhibiting particularly positive attitudes towards their studies and their
institution. These findings are then placed in the wider context of government policy
on widening participation and student financial support between 1997 and 2006,
considering whether any lessons learned are relevant to the post-2006 system of
university-specific bursaries monitored by the Office for Fair Access (OFFA).
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Widening the pool: policy context from 1997 to 2001
Eighteen months after coming to power, the Labour government announced
firm plans to resume the expansion of higher education which had been halted
in the mid-1990s (DfEE, 1998). While this expansion was justified in terms of
social justice and economic competitiveness, it could only be achieved by
reaching out to those groups that had not traditionally engaged in higher
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education, as participation within professional families was already reaching
saturation point (Dearing, 1997).
This policy shift crystallised into a commitment to raise progression rates
into higher education to 50 per cent for 18–30-year-olds by 2010. The objective
was first announced by the then Prime Minister at the Labour Party Confer -
ence on 28 September 1999 (Blair, 1999) and later repeated in both the 2001
and 2005 General Election Manifestos (Labour Party, 2001, 2005).
From the 1998/9 academic year, maintenance support for students was
constricted. The previous package comprised a non-repayable grant and a
repayable loan in roughly equal measures. This was replaced with a 100 per
cent repayable loan. Tuition fees of £1,000 per year were also introduced for
most undergraduate courses, being partly or wholly offset by an additional
grant for students from lower-income backgrounds (i.e. those with a gross
annual income of less than around £30,000). The majority of households
would therefore be expected to increase their financial contributions.
While these changes were coupled with an increase in the safety net pro -
vided through government hardship funds and bursary schemes to attract
mature students, the financial package for the target group of young students
from lower-income backgrounds declined in value. While the total funding
offered to students remained broadly constant, the switch from grants to
loans caused the average debt on graduation to rise sharply to around
£10,000. This, coupled with widespread misunderstanding about liability for
tuition fees (Archer, Hutchings and Ross, 2003; Stuart, 2006), led to fears that
students from lower-income backgrounds might actually be dissuaded from
applying to university at a time when their increased participation was
sought (Callender and Kemp, 2000; Scott, Lewis and Lea, 2001; Pennell and
West, 2005).
It was to be a further three years before the government was to attempt to
reconcile its long-standing policy objective to widen participation with the
level of financial support provided to the target group of prospective stud -
ents. October 2000 saw the publication of The Excellence Challenge (DfEE,
2000), detailing the extra financial incentives that were to be offered to the
young students from lower-income backgrounds; those which the govern -
ment needed to attract in order to meet its 50 per cent participation target.
Alongside funding and structures to promote aspiration-raising and outreach
work with young people from under-represented groups, the document
announced plans for the newly named ‘Opportunity Bursaries’ to be intro -
duced from the 2001/2 academic year. This additional financial support was
targeted at full-time students:
• aged under 21 on 1 September prior to their entry to university;
• from families with a gross annual income of less than £20,000 (broadly
comparable to those not paying tuition fees); and
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• who had attended a school or college within an Excellence in Cities (EiC)
consortium; at the request of the sector, this was later broadened to
encompass those educated within the Education Action Zones (EAZs).
The Opportunity Bursaries were conceived as a pilot scheme to abut with the
Education Maintenance Allowances (EMA) which many of the pupils had
received while at school or in further education. Access to the Opportunity
Bur saries was limited to students drawn from selected urban and semi-urban
areas which were neither necessarily those of the greatest socio-economic
deprivation nor the lowest progression rates into higher education (discussed
in Hatt, Baxter and Harrison, 2003).
A number of universities (as reported in DfEE, 2000) were already promot -
ing similarly targeted bursary schemes at this point, often using money
drawn from government hardship funds to do so. The impetus created by the
Opportunity Bursaries and the need to build administrative systems to
allocate them led more to follow suit, although this remained a minority
pursuit within the sector.
Methodology
This research is based in a large multi-site post-1992 university in the south of
England which took the decision in 2001 to offer additional discretionary
bursaries alongside the national Opportunity Bursaries. The research report -
ed in this article was initiated in 2002, with the intention to investigate the
impact of the new bursaries on students’ attitudes and the impact on their
academic experience. Interim findings from this research have been reported
previously (Hatt, Baxter and Harrison; 2003; Hannan et al, 2005; Hatt, Hannan
and Baxter, 2005), but this article draws the project to a conclusion and sets
the findings in a wider policy context. Two main data collection tools were
used:
• Cohort tracking: the institution’s student record system was used to track
the 3,329 full-time UK undergraduate students1 aged under 21 entering in
the 2001/2 academic year. Their withdrawal and attainment rates were
monitored over a five-year period across a range of demographic
variables, including parental income and possession of a discretionary
bursary.
• Interviews and focus groups: a total of 37 students from different entry
cohorts were interviewed between 2003 and 2005, either individually or in
focus groups. These were drawn from students holding discretionary
bursaries (25 students) or those from low-income backgrounds not receiv -
ing bursaries (12 students). The interviews and focus groups typically
lasted for one hour.
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The 2001/2 bursary cohort and their academic outcomes
In common with other universities, the institution in this study began
offering Opportunity Bursaries to full-time students starting in the 2001/2
academic year. These offered students £2,000 spread over three years, with
£1,000 in the first year and £500 in each subsequent year. In addition, students
living outside the EiC/EAZ areas were given the opportunity to apply for
one-off ‘Start-Up Bursaries’ of £300, provided they met the other criteria for
Opportunity Bursaries (i.e. that they were aged under 21 on entry and were
from a low-income household, defined at this time as being under £20,000
gross per year).
Students had to make a proactive decision to apply for a bursary; they
were not awarded automatically to those from lower-income backgrounds. To
encourage application, all students were sent forms and guidance notes
immediately after they confirmed their offer of a place, and, in theory, 944
entrants from low-income backgrounds could have been eligible for a
bursary. However, only 332 students applied for and were offered bursaries,
of which 83 were the more generous Opportunity Bursaries. The bursary
holders therefore represent 10 per cent of the total intake of 3,329 students.
As can be seen from Table 1, aside from financial circumstances, the
bursary-holding population broadly mirrored that of the wider cohort,
although it contained relatively more female students, younger students
(within the 18–20 age range) and students from black or minority ethnic
backgrounds.
Table 1: The bursary-holder population
Bursary holders Non-bursary holders
(n = 332) (n = 2,997)
Female 187 (56.3%) 1,359 (45.3%)
Aged 18 on entry 170 (51.2%) 1,326 (44.2%)
Aged 19 on entry 120 (36.1%) 1,231 (41.1%)
Aged 20 on entry 41 (12.3%) 430 (14.3%)
White ethnicity 260 (78.3%) 2,660 (80.1%)
Black or minority ethnicity 46 (13.8%) 334 (9.6%)
Disabled 20 (6.0%) 193 (6.5%)
From the local area 42 (12.7%) 384 (12.8%)
From the sub-region 69 (20.8%) 547 (18.3%)
Note: some categories do not add up to the column total owing to missing data.
After one year, it was found that bursary-holding students were significantly
more likely to successfully progress into a second academic year than stud -
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ents from low-income backgrounds who had not received a bursary (Hatt,
Hannan and Baxter, 2005). This triangulates with the national evaluation of
the Opportunity Bursary scheme, which found that the first-year retention
rate for Opportunity Bursary holders was 2.6 per cent higher than for lower-
income students who had not been offered a bursary (West et al, 2006).
A similar analysis has now been repeated after five full academic
years. At this point, 68 per cent of the total 2001/2 entry cohort has completed
an award. 25 per cent withdrew, transferred outside the university or were
academically failed during that period. The remaining 7 per cent were still
registered for study, including students who have transferred within the
university, those retaking one or more years and those temporarily
suspending their studies.
Table 2: Income levels, bursaries and completion
Withdrawn/ Completed Still Total
failed studying
Lower-income students 252 2,240 217 2,309
– bursary holders 16.8% 77.7% 5.5%
Lower-income students 190 2,388 257 2,635
– no bursary 29.9% 61.1% 9.0%
All lower-income 242 2,628 274 2,944
students 25.6% 66.5% 7.8%
All other students1 575 1,646 164 2,385
24.1% 69.0% 6.9%
Total 817 2,274 238 3,329
24.5% 68.3% 7.1%
There was no significant difference (X2 = 2.132, 2 d.f., p = 0.344) in educational
outcome after five years between students from lower-income backgrounds
and those with more affluent families. However, within the lower-income
background group, students holding bursaries were significantly (X2 =
25.513, 2 d.f., p<0.001) less likely to have withdrawn and more likely to have
completed their studies within five years than those without bursaries. For
example, only 17 per cent of bursary holders withdrew during this period,
compared with 30 per cent of other students from lower-income backgrounds
and 25 per cent of the cohort as a whole. Possession of a bursary was therefore
found to be associated strongly with persistence and completion, both in
comparison to other lower-income students and to the cohort as a whole.
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Table 3: Income levels, bursaries and degree performance
First or Upper Lower Second, Third, Total
Second Pass or lesser award
Lower-income students 163 77 240
– bursary holders 67.9% 32.1%
Lower-income students 218 170 388
– no bursary 56.2% 43.8%
All lower-income 381 247 628
students 60.7% 39.3%
All other students 957 689 1,646
58.1% 41.9%
Total 1,338 936 2,274
58.8% 41.2%
Similarly, there was no relationship between family income and degree classi -
fication for those students who had successfully completed their course (X2 =
1.199, 1 d.f., p = 0.273), but bursary-holding students from low-income famil -
ies were significantly more likely (X2 = 8.552, 1 d.f., p = 0.003) to have gained a
first or upper second class degree than their peers without bursaries. Of the
bursary holders 68 per cent achieved a high-graded degree, compared with
56 per cent of lower-income students without bursaries and 58 per cent of the
cohort as a whole.
To summarise: students from lower-income backgrounds who had suc -
cess fully procured a bursary were significantly less likely to have withdrawn
from their course than students from similar backgrounds who had no
bursary and, once completed, they were more likely to achieve a first or
upper second class degree. These findings strongly suggest that some aspect
of being a bursary holder is related to academic persistence and success.
However, they do not illuminate the nature of this relationship nor the dire -
ction of its causality.
Interviews were therefore undertaken with 25 bursary holders and 12
stud ents from lower-income backgrounds who had not applied for or re -
ceived a bursary. Based on these interviews, three initial hypotheses pre -
sented themselves:
1 That the provision of targeted funding reduces the risk of withdrawal
and potential for success by relieving students’ financial concerns,
espec ially in the first term.
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This was the most common rationalisation made by students for the efficacy
of bursaries. They explained that it enabled them to purchase one-off high-
cost items (e.g. books or travel cards) or that it removed the need for them to
find part-time work immediately after starting their studies, thereby enabling
them to settle in more easily. This is supported by national research (West et al,
2006), which found that students holding Opportunity Bursaries were less
worried about financial difficulties and part-time employment than other
low-income students.
This hypothesis is challenged by the fact that there is no significant
difference (X2 = 0.036, 2 d.f., p = 0.982) in outcomes between students receiv -
ing an Opportunity Bursary (£1,000 in the first year and £500 in subsequent
years) and those receiving a Start-Up Bursary (£300 in the first year only). In
fact, the outcomes for students holding the two different types of bursary
were very similar overall. This would suggest that it is the possession of a
bursary which is salient, not the size of that bursary.
2 That the provision of a bursary establishes a particular ‘attachment’ 
bet ween the university and the student, where the student rationalises
the offer as a sign that the university has a positive attitude towards
them and their peers from a similar background.
A small number of students felt that the bursary schemes demonstrated a
commitment to reaching out to students from groups not traditionally assoc -
iated with higher education. While the Opportunity Bursaries were a national
scheme, they were administered by individual institutions who were asked to
generate publicity materials, distribute application forms, assess eligibility
and make comparative decisions where demand outstripped supply. Stud -
ents therefore tended to associate the bursaries with their university, rath er
than with a governmental initiative. The Start-Up Bursaries were unique to the
university in this study, though a small number of other institutions had
similar schemes.
Interviewees were generally very conscious of their status as ‘first-gener -
ation’ entrants to higher education and that they differed from the tradi tional
student body, particularly in terms of parental expectations and financial circ -
um stances. Many of the students had become mentors or ambassadors in
order to take an active role in widening participation further.
It is therefore hypothesised that the correspondence between the student
and the university in the six months prior to arrival was instrumental in
creating an ‘attachment’ around the act of applying for and being awarded a
bursary. This projected a respect for their social background and an inclusive
institutional habitus (as outlined in Thomas, 2002). This effect of building a
relationship between a student and a university before they arrive may also
promote a type of reciprocity where the student feels duty-bound to respond to
the bursary with increased motivation and commitment towards their studies
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(Yorke and Thomas, 2003) or a more positive attitude in general (West et al,
2006). It has been reported that these are two essential components in defining
withdrawal patterns (Johnston, 1997; Bennett, 2003; Universities UK, 2003).
3 That the students applying for and securing bursaries are highly
motivated and organised; attributes which later predispose them
towards academic success.
It is estimated that only between a third and a half of students eligible for a
bursary successfully secured one, despite all students in the cohort being sent
information by the institution and a government information campaign to
schools and colleges. This tended not to be due to selective decision-making,
but to the apparent existence of a limited propensity to apply amongst
students eligible to do so. Under this hypothesis, the possession of a bursary
would essentially act as a marker for a certain type of student, who was dili -
gent in reading information sent by the university, correctly analysed their
eligibility for a bursary, was motivated to apply and took the time to compile
an application within the deadline.
This was illustrated by the interviews with bursary holders. They were a
group with high levels of focus and application, both in individual interviews
and focus groups. They felt that they had had to overcome more significant
barriers to get as far as they had and there was a degree of resentment or ‘class
jealousy’ of students who they perceived to have had an easier route (Skeggs,
1997; Bloomer and Hodkinson, 2000; Archer, Hutchings and Ross, 2003; Reay,
David and Ball, 2005). They appreciated the chances which they had been
given and were determined to make the most of them, making a proactive
decision to enter higher education (Ball et al, 2002), and seeing the bursaries as
a positive tool to this end. In contrast, none of the low-income students not sec -
ur ing a bursary had any recollection of being invited to apply for a bursary.
A slight variant of this hypothesis was suggested by a small number of
inter viewees who talked about peers from their school who had not applied.
They suggested that a sense of class-based pride may have underpinned a
posi tive decision not to seek additional financial support. In addition, some
bursary holders had delegated responsibility for completing all finance-
related forms to their parents. In this instance, it is the diligence of the parents
and their ability and willingness to engage with a bureaucratic process which
is at issue.
It should be noted that these three hypotheses are not mutually exclusive
and, indeed, the second could easily have a reinforcing effect on the third.
From opportunity to competitive market: policy context from
2001 to 2006
The previous section has argued that even small bursaries provided valuable
financial support which may have contributed to the retention of this group of
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lower-income students. Added to this, the policy itself also helped students to
identify with the institution and to see it as a place for students like them selves.
Bursaries may also have acted as a marker for characteristics which lead to
success, while appreciating there could be non-financial reasons why students
did not apply for them, not least due to the agency of their parents. This final
section will examine what the study can tell us about the new student support
system being developed by universities for the 2006/7 aca dem ic year.
In January 2003, the White Paper, The Future of Higher Education (DfES,
2003a), revealed the government’s intention to deregulate significant aspects
of the higher education sector from 2006/7 onwards, not least the permitting
of flexibility in the tuition fees chargeable. Universities were to be permitted
to charge up to £3,000 per year for most undergraduate courses, provided
that an undefined proportion of the additional income was ploughed back
into attracting and retaining students from under-represented groups. Fur -
ther policy details were provided three months later (DfES, 2003b). The White
Paper also signalled the extension of the Opportunity Bursary prin ciple to all
lower-income students (including those aged over 21 on entry) as a ‘Higher
Education Grant’ from 2004/5 onwards.
The management of this system was passed from universities to the Local
Education Authorities and the Student Loans Company, with all students
automatically receiving support if their (or their parents’) income was below
the relevant threshold. It should be noted that this administrative change
largely isolated universities from the act of providing discretionary support
to lower-income students; an important component in the reaction of bursary
holders identified in the interviews and focus groups.
Changes were also announced to student maintenance funding from
2006/7 onwards. The details were later amended to placate Labour ‘top-up
fee rebels’ in the run-up to the Higher Education Bill (Clarke, 2004a; DfES,
2004). A new ‘Higher Education Maintenance Grant’ (HEMG) was announ -
ced for full-time students of all ages from low-income backgrounds (i.e. less
than £33,000 gross per year2), totalling £2,700 per year for students from the
very poorest backgrounds. Meanwhile, students were given the option of
paying their tuition fees up front or deferring them with an additional loan
which is added to their total borrowing. The debt to the Student Loans Com -
pany on graduation for a student receiving the full student loan and deferring
their tuition fees of £3,000 would thus rise to over £22,000.
In exchange for deregulating tuition fees, the White Paper sought to
commit universities to ‘robust and challenging’ Access Agreements which
will ‘safeguard and promote’ access to higher education (DfES, 2003a). One
aspect of these agreements was that universities would be expected to pro -
vide additional financial support to their lower-income students and those
from under-represented groups in the form of bursaries. Little detail of
expectations was provided at this point, but examples were later given of
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perceived good practice at Oxford, Cambridge, Nottingham and Warwick
(DfES, 2003b).
This lack of detail sparked a period of uncertainty and debate. Ministers
were reportedly applying pressure on universities to commit to contributing
at least one-third of the top-up fee income to bursaries (Sanders, 2003), while
a number of influential figures were making a case for a national bursary
scheme in contrast to the free market implied by the White Paper (e.g.
Thorne, 2003; Sanders, 2004). Post-1992 institutions were concerned that their
funds would necessarily need to be spread across their wider pool of stud -
ents, with the result that they would need to plough a higher proportion of
their additional income into bursaries or risk the offers made to individual
students being significantly less generous than those made by the pre-1992
institutions (Thorne, 2003).
This debate finally collapsed into a clumsy compromise that would see all
universities supplementing the HEMG for students from low-income back -
grounds with a statutory national bursary of £300,3 to be enforced by the
fledgling Office for Fair Access (OFFA) through institutional Access Agree -
ments (Clarke, 2004b). Combined with the HEGM, this theoretically made
top-up fees cost-neutral for this group of students.4 The concept of a defined
proportion of the top-up fee income to be recycled through institution-
specific bursaries was also dropped, with the strong steer that universities
would be expected to do more than the £300 bare minimum and with the
rejoinder that the Secretary of State would use reserve powers ‘if necessary to
protect the poorest students’ (Clarke, 2004b).
In OFFA’s guidance on the preparation of their Access Agreement (OFFA,
2004), universities are invited to ‘go beyond the minimum bursary require -
ments and offer a wider range of financial support’, but are warned that this
can only be counted in the context of the Access Agreement where this is
‘appropriately targeted with the specific intention of encouraging and supp -
orting students who are under-represented in HE’. Universities were thus
given a free hand to decide how much to invest in bursaries to promote
access, while also not being prevented from creating controversial bursaries
without a specific access brief or with a conspicuously elitist brief which
would not be reflected within the Access Agreement (Hill and Baty, 2004).
With nearly all universities charging tuition fees of £3,000 for all courses in
2006/7, the government’s aim of making ‘student choice a much more
powerful force’ (DfES, 2003a) through the levying of differential fees appears
to have foundered at the first hurdle. Instead, the main financial differ -
entiation, and thus competition, is being expressed through a ‘volatile mar -
ket’ (in the words of Sir Martin Harris, Director of OFFA, quoted in Hill, 2005)
in university-specific bursaries. Amounts varying between £300 and £4,000 a
year are thus on offer, although there is clear market segmentation between
recruiting and selection institutions.
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Across the HE sector as a whole, 29 per cent of the estimated £429 million
additional income generated by top-up fees is going to be ploughed back into
access-related initiatives (Goddard, 2005), a figure which is surprisingly close
to the government’s original intentions. However, there is wide variation
around this figure, with universities allocating anywhere between 11 per cent
and 78 per cent. Alongside the variation in proportion of additional income
being recycled, there are significant differences in the targeting and
administration of bursaries.
The government had begun with an intention to deregulate the tuition
fee market within higher education in order to increase choice while
generating additional funding for the section. Bursaries were seen as
primarily a tool in widening participation and in ameliorating some of the
negative views around increased fees. However, universities had, in the
final analysis, been given almost complete freedom to devise and imple -
ment discretionary bursary schemes. Thus, the final system for 2006/7 pre -
sented little differ ent ia tion in tuition fees, but a wide variety of competing
bursary schemes; oppor tunity, access and competition had become inexor -
ably linked.
The future of bursaries post-2006
A number of interesting distinctions can therefore be drawn between the
Opportunity Bursaries and the new post-2006 bursaries:
1 The rationale for Opportunity Bursaries was specifically focused on attracting
(and retaining) students from lower-income backgrounds from specific target
neighbourhoods into higher education in general, rather than to particular
institutions.
2 The criteria for awarding Opportunity Bursaries were set nationally within this
social justice agenda, although individual institutions had a degree of latitude
around implementation; this was generally exercised through student services or
finance departments.
3 The criteria, size and administration of the post-2006 bursaries rests within
institutions, where an agenda around recruiting students to that specific
institution has ensured the involvement of senior managers, marketers and those
responsible for admissions.
It is therefore little wonder that many of the post-2006 bursary schemes bear
little resemblance to the Opportunity Bursaries which preceded them. A
comprehensive survey of the schemes across all institutions is beyond the
scope of this article. However, some recurring themes can be drawn out
through examining the Access Agreements, which, after approval, have been
publicly stored on the OFFA website (OFFA, 2005); additional information is
also generally available through externally facing university websites.
14 JOURNAL OF ACCESS POLICY & PRACTICE VOL.5 NO.1
• Income-contingent. Nearly all planned bursary schemes have a component
of means testing, although the mechanics vary considerably between
institutions. Some offer a flat-rate bursary to students whose families are
below a certain threshold (e.g. Sheffield Hallam), while others have a
tapered (e.g. UWE) or pound-for-pound system which tracks the HEMG
(e.g. King’s). There is considerable difference in the size of bursaries on
offer, with Oxbridge and other pre-1992 universities tending to offer more
lucrative packages than newer universities, e.g. £10,000 over three years at
Oxford with £1,000 per year at Thames Valley.
• Universal support. A small number of HEIs (e.g. Sunderland, Winchester)
offer bursaries to all new undergraduates, essentially discounting the fee
from the headline level of £3,000 without being seen to be offering lower-
priced courses. Central Lancashire’s means-testing threshold of £60,000
family income is so high that their bursary scheme is almost universal,
whereas Coventry are attempting to provide a taper at the point at which
the HEMG ends, such that students whose parental income is between
£37,425 and £47,425 actually receive a slightly higher bursary than those
from low-income households.
• Regionally-focused – The mission of some institutions to attract more local
students is reflected in specific bursaries for students drawn from
particular areas. In some instances, these are low participation postcodes
(e.g. Leeds), while in others (e.g. Bristol), they merely reflect a
geographical catchment area in the context of increased localism in
student recruitment.
• Franchise/compact-based – Related to the previous category are those
bursary schemes which target students recruited through either franchise/
partner colleges (e.g. Bolton) and/or schools which are part of an institu -
tional ‘compact’ arrangement (e.g. Kingston, Plymouth).
• Academic potential or success – Around a fifth of HEIs have sought to
incorporate some form of academic criteria into their bursary (or more
usually termed ‘scholarship’) schemes, alongside means testing. In some
instances (e.g. Birmingham, Hertfordshire), all students achieving a cer -
tain number of UCAS points or A-level scores are rewarded, while other
schemes (e.g. Brighton, East London) have a competitive edge and are
focused on a restricted number of the ‘most promising’ or ‘most able’
appli cants. Many institutions are intending to extend academic bursaries/
scholarships to the more traditional student groups, but these are not
detailed within the Access Agreements.
• ‘Under-represented’ groups – Some HEIs have sought to extend the concept
of access beyond students from low-income backgrounds, focusing on
particular groups with barriers to entry into higher education or which are
otherwise under-represented (e.g. Loughborough [age], Keele [ethnicity],
Winchester [care leavers], Bristol [disability]). Some of these schemes will
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rely on active self-declaration by students, which may prove problematic
in terms of both administration and penetration.
• Successful progression – One noteworthy characteristic of a relatively small
number of bursary schemes is the need for the student to show approp -
riate progression, either in terms of a baseline first-attempt pass (e.g. East
London), a particular grade average (e.g. Lancaster – over 55 per cent) or
as a specific requirement for a bursary targeted at high achieve ment (e.g.
Liverpool’s Attainment Scholarships for those averaging 70 per cent and
above).
The sheer diversity of this ‘bewildering range of bursaries and scholarships’
has been noted (Tysome, 2006), such that OFFA-backed awards are now
available to institutions which offer ‘something that stands out in the
crowded market’ in terms of the targeting students from under-represented
groups and how the effectiveness of the bursary scheme is monitored.
Perhaps most noteworthy is how the deliberate degree of institutional
autonomy in the creation of bursary schemes has fuelled such diversity of
practice, not all of which necessarily meets the government’s agenda to
widen participation at first inspection. It would appear, for example, that a
number of institutions have used the bursary primarily to enhance their
reputation as a centre of excellence. Parallels can be drawn between this
aspect of the implementation of government widening participation policy
and that surrounding the use of the ‘postcode premium’ in the HEFCE fund -
ing mechanism, where ‘light-touch’ monitoring also offered significant
institu tional autonomy.
Conclusions
The data presented above suggest a number of clear messages relevant to the
current government policy, which will see the proportion of students holding
discretionary bursaries rise sharply in the coming years.
First, that even small sums of additional money appear to have reassuring
effect for students from low-income backgrounds, helping them to meet first-
year start-up costs and to feel less pressured to take on part-time work. Given
the importance which has been placed on the student’s first term or first year
(Yorke et al, 1997; Ozga and Sukhnandan, 1998), this effect of relieving anxiety
is likely to pay dividends for longer-term retention and success (Andrews
and Wilding, 2004; Robotham and Julian, 2006). This is likely to be of growing
importance at a time when students’ perceptions are that higher education is
becomingly increasingly expensive and that their ability to manage their
money successfully is declining (UNITE, 2005).
However, the nature of the cash flows to universities may work to under -
mine this gain for the post-2006 bursaries. The money processed by the
Student Loans Company in the form of loans taken to offset tuition fees is to
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be paid on to universities in two instalments; in February and May. As this is
the income stream from which the bursaries are paid, most institutions have
felt unable to make bursary payments before February; five months after
most students start their course. This sub-optimal arrangement means that
the value of bursaries for meeting start-up costs and relieving initial financial
anxiety will therefore be much diminished, limiting their practical utility.
Meanwhile, it would appear that the actual size of bursary offered may
not be that important to students’ retention or success and it is questionable
whether prospective students will make decisions on this basis (Whitehead,
Raffan and Deaney, 2006). This approach, where financial concerns are less
important than other choice mechanisms, could well undermine (or even
pervert) the competitive market between institutions which the government
has set to create. It is particularly questionable whether the pre-1992 univer -
sit ies, who are generally able to offer larger bursaries, will see a payback in
terms of widened participation. Meanwhile, institutions offering large bur -
sar ies may find that the ‘return’ for their investment is no larger than those
offering more modest amounts, especially if students from lower-income
backgrounds use their bursaries to direct funds to their families (Sanders,
2006). The rational financial market for bursaries is likely to be further
undermined by the finding that ‘working-class students prioritise the local
and the familiar’ (Reay, David and Ball, 2005, p 95) when making educational
choices, limiting their possible financial gain by seeking entry only to local
universities.
Secondly, that there may be problems with ensuring that bursaries reach
the students that are entitled and need them most, based on the experiences
detailed in this study. There is an implicit assumption (e.g. to be found in
West et al, 2006) that all students will act rationally and apply for all the supp -
ort available to them. However, the sheer complexity of the new bursary sys -
tem and baffling array of choices challenges the ability of young people to
make well-informed choices when considering bursaries, with two-thirds
reporting that they are unaware whether they would be entitled or not
(Shepherd, 2006a). Only between one-third and half of the students in this
study applied for a bursary for which they were eligible.
Many of the proposed systems are linked directly to the HEGM means test
and will therefore be automatically awarded. However, those reliant on com -
petit ive application or self-declaration run the risk of passively excluding
some students who might be eligible to receive support. This will be exacer -
bated for working-class students for whom interaction with bureaucracy or
competitive application procedures may be problematic or anathema (Archer,
Hutchings and Ross, 2003; Reay, David and Ball, 2005). While a 2002 Univer -
sities UK report (Woodrow et al, 2002) into widening participation argued for
a simplification of financial support for students from lower-income back -
grounds, the post-2006 bursary system has moved in a diametrically opposite
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direction. Those post-2006 bursaries which are focused on specific under-
represented groups (e.g. care leavers) may suffer particular difficulties with
self-identification and administration. There are also fears that students who
choose not to permit electronic data-sharing between the Student Loans
Company and universities will also be disadvantaged, with their bursary
entitlement delayed or jeopardised (Shepherd, 2005).
There is, therefore, a real danger that some of the most under-represented
groups may not be aware of their entitlement or may otherwise find
themselves excluded from receiving their discretionary bursary. They will
then not benefit from the positive outcomes with which the Opportunity
Bursaries are associated.
Thirdly, that bursary schemes send strong messages about the nature of
that institution which are relevant to the issues of recruitment and retention
of students from groups which have not traditionally engaged with higher
education. Students historically receiving Opportunity Bursaries or other
discretionary bursaries on the basis of their status as ‘low-income’ and/or
‘first-generation’ formed an early institutional attachment which has been
found to be associated with high levels of retention and success. From
interviews with students, this appears to be tied to the university’s lead role
in administering the schemes, where the student feels that being offered a
bursary legitimised their presence at the university; even if the university is in
reality administering funds on behalf of the government, as with the former
Opportunity Bursaries. 
In the context of the post-2006 system, it is hypothesised that this uplift in
positive attachment to the institution may not be felt through the centrally
administered Higher Education Maintenance Grant, or through institution-
specific bursaries where the administration is subcontracted to the Student
Loans Company. One of the positive outcomes of the Opportunity Bursary
scheme could potentially be lost.
New messages will be generated by the post-2006 bursaries, with their
myriad of criteria and conditions. Some have a strong regional flavour or one
which seeks to develop or concrete compact arrangements with particular
schools or colleges. Others seek to emphasise academic attainment or poten -
tial. The results of this study suggest that the nature of the bursary scheme
will contribute to the student’s construction of the institutional habitus
(Thomas, 2002) and its portrayal to applicants from the targeted groups.
Students entering higher education from 2006 onwards will have different
responses to the various university-specific bursary schemes, which may be
more or less positive than those summarised in this article. Institutions
should consider this when reviewing and marketing their bursary schemes to
each successive cohort of students.
In conclusion, a key feature of the student financial support system intro -
duced in September 2006 is a competitive (but potentially illusory) ‘market’
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based around bursaries – and not tuition fees, as the government had
intended. But is it a market in any real sense, and how will it impact on the
government’s own agenda to widen participation? Does the market model,
with its assumptions of financial rationality, informed decision-making and
freedom of movement, support or fail the students from lower-income
backgrounds which it is designed to assist? Does devolved implementation
and institutional autonomy offer the most effective means of implementing
government policy around widening participation?
This article has argued that the implementation of the post-2006 bursary
system has not learned from the lessons of the Opportunity Bursaries, with a
real danger that potential gains in access, retention and success have been
placed in jeopardy. With progress towards the government’s 50 per cent
participation target faltering badly, wobbles from the Director of Fair Access
(Meikle, 2007) and renewed concerns about social mix and withdrawal
(Fazackerley, 2006; Shepherd, 2006b), it would seem timely to look again at
how the bursary system can offer maximum benefits to students, universities
and policy makers.
NOTES
1 Excluding healthcare students, who fell under a different funding regime. They have
been excluded from this analysis on the basis that no data are available for their
parental income and so lower-income students cannot be identified.
2 This figure has since risen to £37,425.
3 Or potentially less if the student is being charged less than £3,000 in tuition fees.
4 This was actually illusory, as the detail of the conversion between the Higher Education
Grant (2004 to 2006) and the Higher Education Maintenance Grant (2006 onwards)
meant that most students from lower-income backgrounds were effectively £1,000 per
year out of pocket. This loss will be exacerbated by a reduced student loan entitlement
for students receiving the Higher Education Maintenance Grant. The post-2006
bursaries will go some way to meeting this gap, but most are insufficiently large to
replace the full amount. As a result, the majority of students from lower-income
backgrounds will be worse off in 2006/7 in terms of their total support package than
they would have been had they entered higher education in 2004/5. This is not
included in Pennell and West’s (2005) otherwise comprehensive analysis of changes in
student support. As in the late 1990s, the Labour government has from 2006/7 reduced
funding for students from lower-income backgrounds at the same time as holding a
policy objective to widen participation from this same group.
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